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REPRESENTATION FOR THE POOR IN
FEDERAL RULEMAKING
Arthur Earl Bonfield*
I.

THE PROBLEM

A. Generally
sound operation of the federal administrative rulemaking
system demands that all relevant interests and viewpoints be
considered prior to the formulation and promulgation of its product. Only after such an examination can the responsible officials
have any confidence in the soundness of the rules they create. Officials
engaged in rulemaking for the federal government are usually apprised of the various interests and viewpoints deserving consideration
in that process by representatives of individuals affected by their
actions.
The ample personal economic resources and relatively well-financed organizations of middle and upper income Americans usually assure their particular interests adequate representation in
federal administrative rulemaking. The norm is that middle and
upper income individuals, or their personal or organizational representatives, directly or indirectly monitor all agency activities.
These persons attempt to protect their interests through formal
or informal participation in rulemaking affecting them. But federal rulemaking very frequently affects large numbers of individuals
who lack the personal economic resources and organized associations
of middle and upper income Americans. These economically underprivileged persons are usually unable to keep themselves adequately
informed of the numerous actual or proposed exercises of rulemaking
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Appendix B of this Article. Those specific recommendations are the only statements
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the Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the executive departments and administrative agencies for improvements in those procedures by which the
administrative bodies of our national government determine private rights and
obligations.
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authority affecting their interests. Normally the poor are also unable
to communicate effectively to the appropriate authority their views
about proposed rules, or to petition in their own interest for new
rules or for the amendment or repeal of old rules.
An agency promulgating rules affecting the poor cannot assume
that it automatically knows what is best for such people. Government administrators are usually persons with middle-class backgrounds, experiences, and associations; therefore, they tend to have
middle-class viewpoints, orientations, and understandings. This
means that the personnel of federal agencies may be expected to
reflect more accurately the interests of the affluent than those of
the economically underprivileged. Consequently, there is a special
reason for concern when, as is now the case, the interests of poor
people are inadequately represented in the rulemaking process.
The administration of government undoubtedly suffers as a
whole from the inability of the economically underprivileged segment of our society to represent adequately its group interests in
the rulemaking process. The inability of the poor in this respect
is injurious to the government's sound administration because it
sometimes results in the formulation and promulgation of policy
without consideration of all the relevant viewpoints. Recent responses of the poor to the product of such an improperly functioning
process have been expensive, time-consuming, and unfortunately,
too often destructive. Ill-considered rules have frequently caused
litigation, civil disobedience, and on occasion, riot. Some of this
might have been avoided if the views of the poor were considered
in the initial formulation of agency policies affecting them.
This conclusion does not ignore the many well-intentioned and
often considerable efforts of the appropriate officials to ascertain,
by their own investigations, the views of the economically underprivileged concerning administrative rulemaking that affects them.
But available evidence establishes that these official efforts have
been insufficient to compensate for the inability of the poor affirmatively to represent their own interests in rulemaking. The fact is
that government administrators are too often inadequately apprised
of the poor's views respecting the desirability of existing or proposed rules.

B. General Summary of the Evidence
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the poor of
our society have been inadequately represented in federal rulemak-
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ing. Some original data on this subject was obtained from a questionnaire entitled "Survey of Participation of the Poor in Agency
Rulemaking of Particular Interest to the Poor" distributed to some
forty federal agencies during the summer of 1968.1
Each federal agency surveyed was asked the following initial
question:
I. What programs does your department or agency administer
a. that are directed primarily at the economically underprivileged
segments of our society, or,
b. although not directed primarily at such segments, may have
a very substantial impact on them?

Most agencies listed those programs under their respective jurisdictions reasonably falling within the above categories. However,
the questionnaire responses indicated that a few agencies administering programs in class (l)(b) above do not recognize that they
are in fact doing so. That is, even though they are administering
some programs having a very substantial impact on the poor, a significant number of agencies replied to question (l)(b) by stating
that they administered no programs of that type. 2 In addition, a few
I. The following agencies responded to the questionnaire which was distributed
as a survey of the Rulemaking Co=ittee of the Administrative Conference of the
United States: Department of Justice; Civil Service Commission; Post Office Department; Department of Agriculture; Department of the Interior; Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare; Tennessee Valley Authority; Department of Labor; Office of
Economic Opportunity; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Federal Power
Commission; United States Commission on Civil Rights; Small Business Administration; National Capital Planning Co=ission; Federal Communications Commission;
Securities and Exchange Commission; Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the
United States; National Science Foundation; National Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children; Smithsonian Institution; President's Council on
Youth Opportunity; Department of State; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority; Department of the Treasury; General Services Administration; Appalachian
Regional Commission; Interstate Commerce Commission; Farm Credit Administration;
Federal Reserve System; Veterans Administration; Federal Home Loan Bank Board;
Department of Commerce; Department of Housing and Urban Development.
2. The following examples are illustrative:
"Concerning the study that your Committee on Rulemaking is making of participation of the poor in agency rulemaking .•• [the U.S. Civil Service Co=ission is]
declining to attempt to fill out the questionnaire because we do not believe it is
applicable to us.'' Yet that body makes the general rules for government hiring and
classification of employees, and it administers nondiscrimination in government
employment [under Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 §§ 103, 104 (1965)].
"Please be advised that the General Services Administration does not appear to
have programs of the nature contemplated by the Survey of Participation of the Poor
in Agency Rulemaking.'' Yet many of the programs administered by this agency
undoubtedly fit within class (l)(b) of the question in the text since the manner and
conditions under which the national government purchases and sells supplies and
property and cares for and constructs federal buildings undoubtedly has a substantial
impact on the poor.
"This is in reply to your letter of July 18 which requested responses to a survey
questionnaire dealing with programs administered by (the Post Office] Department
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agencies that did list some programs having a substantial impact
on the poor neglected to list all of their programs fitting into that
category.3 If the agencies involved do not understand that some of
their programs have a substantial impact on the poor, or cannot
determine which of their programs have that effect and which do
not, the interests of such persons are inadequately represented in
rulemaking for those programs.
The questionnaire also asked the agencies surveyed:
5. Does your agency now attempt to ascertain the views of poor and
economically underprivileged persons in respect to rules and
policies proposed to be issued to implement the programs listed
in response to question I above? If so, please describe in detail
the procedures you use in each program to ascertain these views.

About one third of the agencies claiming to administer programs
substantially affecting the poor indicated that they had not previously attempted to ascertain the views of economically underpriviwhich are directed at or have a very substantial impact on the poor. The Department
does not administer any such programs. Our primary activity, moving the mail, and
our programs to effect that end, are not directed at any economic group and do not
have the impact on the poor contemplated by your questionnaire." Yet the Post Office
is one of the largest actual or potential government employers of "poor" people. Its
part-time hiring during Christmas, for example, has a substantial impact on the poor.
In addition, whether it delivers mail on five or six days a week may have a qualitatively greater impact on the poor than on others. If the poor cannot get their welfare
or social security checks on time because mail is delivered only five days a week, they
have no other resources to fall back. on.
3. The following examples are illustrative.
While the Department of Labor lists enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964)] implemented by regulations found in 29 C.F.R.
pt. 31 (1968), it does not list its role as implementor of Executive Order No. 11,246, 30
Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). The former program is to effectuate the policy of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that no person shall, on the ground of race, color, etc. be excluded
from participation in or discriminated against in any program receiving federal
financial assistance from the Department of Labor, while the latter is a program administered by that Department to assure nondiscrimination in employment by government contractors and subcontractors. In addition, while the Department of Labor
does list the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, 7 U.S.C. § 2041 (1964),
implemented by regulations found in 29 C.F.R. pt. 40 (1968), it does not list as a program
substantially affecting the poor the bracero program partially administered by that
department under 20 C.F.R. § 602.10 (1968). The former program requires certain
persons to obtain certificates of registration prior to performing any activities which
constitute engagement in farm labor contracting, while the latter requires that the
Secretary of Labor certify certain facts as a condition for the admission o'.' aliens to
perform certain temporary agricultural or logging industry services.
While the Department of Agriculture lists many programs it administers ,,aving a
substantial impact on the poor it does not list the price support and proiuction
stabilization programs administered by the Commodity Credit Corporation and the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. Also omitted from the Department's enumeration of its programs having a substantial impact on the poor are the
Rural Electrification Administration programs and Federal Extension Service programs. See 1968-69 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 273-77, 283, 294.
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leged persons with respect to rules and policies proposed by the
agencies to implement those programs. A typical response of this
kind stated that "We do not now attempt to ascertain the views of
the poor and economically underprivileged, as such."4
About two thirds of the agencies reporting that they administered programs substantially affecting the poor stated that they had
made some efforts to ascertain the views of those people with respect to rulemaking for such programs. In most cases, however,
the efforts described are totally inadequate for the purpose. They
are frequently haphazard, unsystematic, and sporadic. 5 The means
used have sometimes been so informal and unstructured as to
achieve the result only incidentally and accidentally if at all. 6 Furthermore, agencies frequently seem to have sought information
about the views of the poor from persons who are neither poor nor
reliable spokesmen for the mass of the poor affected by those agencies' actions. 7 The answers to question 5 also indicate that very few
4. Veterans Administration. Responses of a significant number of other agencies
were similar. The following examples are illustrative:
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board reported that it "makes no special provision
to secure the views of poor persons." The Tennessee Valley Authority simply answered
question 5 "No." "The (Federal Power] Commission does not make an overt effort to
solicit the advice of the poor as such ••••" "The Department [of Transportation]
does not, by regulation, specifically, attempt to ascertain the views of the poor in
regulatory activities listed in paragraph l." "The views of poor and economically
underprivileged persons have not been actively solicited (by the Federal Reserve
System] in respect to rules and policies regarding the program mentioned in lb,
above • • • ." "There is no regular procedure in effect whereby the views of the poor
are obtained in connection with the issuance of policies and procedures" of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Many of the above responses do, however, go on and assert specifically that this
does not mean that the interests and views of the poor are ignored with respect to
that portion of the agency's policy-making which affects them.
5. The following examples are illustrative:
For three out of the five programs reported by the Small Business Administration
as having a substantial impact on the poor, it answered question 5 "No." While it
claimed to make an effort to ascertain the views of the poor with respect to some
programs, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare reported that it did not
make a specific attempt to solicit regularly the views of the poor as such with respect
to rulemaking for the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Programs and the
Social and Rehabilitation Services Programs. The Department of Agriculture reported
that it "has not heretofore, on its own initiative attempted to ascertain the views of
poor and economically underprivileged persons in respect to rules and policies proposed to be issued to implement the listed (food distribution] programs," but it has
attempted to do so with respect to programs administered by the Farmers Home
Administration.
6. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported that
"(o]ur agency ascertains the views of economically underprivileged persons in respect
to rules and policies informally insofar as these views are elicited in the course of
investigation of charges of unlawful practices."
7. For example, the Department of Agriculture reported that it ascertains the
views of the poor with respect to programs administered by the Farmers Home Administration (FHA) from its Technical Action Panels, County FHA Committees, and
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of those agencies stating that they attempt to ascertain the views
of the poor make any consistent efforts to do so through means
specifically and specially tailored to accomplish that result in a reliable way. For example, some agencies claimed that they attempted
to ascertain the views of the poor by issuing general public invitations to all interested people, including the poor, to submit their
views upon particluar rules proposed by the agency. 8
Responses to a further question are also instructive because they
indicate that, in fact, the interests of the poor have rarely had any
continuous and systematic affirmative representation in the federal
rulemaking process. That question asked:
7. Have any particular groups or organizations intervened or otherwise participated for the purpose of representing the views of the
poor in rulemaking or in proposing rules in connection with any
of these programs? If so, please identify the groups or organizations and indicate the frequency of such participation and the
method by which each such group or organization has participated.

About half of the responses from agencies acknowledging that they
administered programs substantially affecting the poor indicated
State FHA Advisory Committees. Yet these bodies rarely if ever have members who are
poor persons themselves, that is, members "of the poor"; and these bodies rarely have
adequate representatives of the poor's views as such among their membership. Some
Technical Action Panels may have the Directors of local Community Action Program
(CAP) organizations and welfare agencies among their number. But these officials do
not necessarily represent the views of the mass of the poor since their CAP or welfare
agency positions are controlled by the establishment, they are not themselves poor,
and frequently their outlook may be middle-class• and establishment-oriented. This
is especially true with respect to the Directors of CAP programs since the Green
Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2790 (Supp. III, 1965·1967), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2790 (1964).
In addition, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reported that:
The Social Security Administration [with respect to Medicare) consults with
the Health Insurance Benefit Advisory Counsel, a panel of 19 persons outstanding
in fields related to hospital, medical and health activities, on matters of general
policy and in the formulation of regulations. The panel includes representatives of
public and private medicine, hospitals, nursing homes, health insurance, labor,
and the general public. The poor, as such, are not represented on the panelthe public, as such, is represented on the panel.
Obviously, attempts to ascertain accurately the views of the poor from these people
are not likely to be very successsful.
8. For example, the Department of Labor reported:
When notice of proposed rulemaking is given, the Department of Labor invites
every interested person to submit written data, views or argument, and, when an
opportunity is provided for oral presentations, to farticipate orally. Special notice
is customarily given labor unions where interest o their members is involved.
And the Federal Trade Commission reported that it attempts to ascertain the views of
the poor "through building up of public records contributed by members and representatives of all sectors of the economy and through the holding of public hearings in
some cases." According to the questionnaire responses, no special effort seems to be made
by these two agencies to notify the poor or solicit their views as distinguished from
the public generally. Certainly the unions are not adequate representatives of the poor's
interests before the Department of Labor.
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that no particular groups or organizations had intervened or otherwise participated in their rulemaking for this purpose.9 An additional number of respondents indicated that outside organizations
had participated, on behalf of the poor, in agency rulemaking for
some programs substantially affecting such people, but not at all
in the rulemaking for other such programs.10
According to the responses received to another interrogatory
contained in the questionnaire, the present situation is not likely
to change very much without external stimulation. The agencies
were asked:
6. Does your agency contemplate using any particular means not
utilized at the present time by it to insure that the views of the
poor are adequately ascertained prior to the promulgation of any
rule intended to implement or affect these programs? I£ so, please
explain in detail.

A number of very important agencies from the point of view of
the poor indicated that they intended to institute new and more
effective means by which to ascertain the views of the poor with
respect to rulemaking substantially affecting those people.11 However, most agency respondents indicated that they had no such plans,
and that they were satisfied with their present efforts in this regard.12
In addition to the responses gleaned from the questionnaire distributed to the various federal government agencies, other evidence
directly or indirectly supports the proposition that the interests of
9. For example, the Department of Transportation reported that: "No particular
groups have intervened or otherwise participated for the purpose of representing the
views of the poor in rulemaking in this Department"; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported that "[n]o group or organization has formally intervened or participated for the specific purpose of representing the views of the poor
in rulemaking"; and TVA simply answered question 7, "No."
10, For example, the Small Business Administration reported that no groups participated to represent the poor in rulemaking for any of its programs except the
Economic Opportunity Loan Program, where many groups have participated for this
purpose. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture reported that for food distribution
programs, some groups had participated, but for Farmers Home Administration programs, "[t]he answer to this 'question is in the negative."
11. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Agriculture (but only in regard to consumer food programs), and the Department of Labor
reported such plans.
12. For example, the Veterans' Administration stated that: "[w]e have no plan at
present to use any particular means other than those explained above, to insure that
the needs of the poor veterans, as such, are ascertained prior to the promulgation of
rules." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported that: "[o]ur agency
does not at present contemplate utilization of other means to insure that the views
of the poor are ascertained prior to promulgation of rules." And the Small Business
Administration and Tennessee Valley Authority both simply replied "No" to question 6.
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the poor have had inadequate representation in federal rulemaking
important to them. Officials of a number of major organizations
purporting to represent some segment of the poor were questioned.13 They indicated that poor people's organizations had only
rarely participated in federal administrative rulemaking, and then
only very recently and on an ad hoc basis. The reasons most often
cited for the failure of the poor to participate more extensively in
that process were their lack of knowledge that rules of interest to
them were being considered, their lack of money to finance such
participation, their lack of knowledge of the means by which they
could participate, and the relevant agencies' lack of interest in ascertaining their views.
The representatives of those poor people's organizations questioned during this study also made another significant point. They
insisted that one of the most important deficiencies of the federal
administrative process is the inability of economically underpriviledged persons to have their views adequately represented in the
formulation of policies affecting them. In this connection it should
be noted that the Poor People's Campaign of 1968 specifically and
repeatedly demanded that there should be greater consultation with
the poor and greater consideration of their views in the formulation
of administrative regulations affecting them.14 In responding to these
13. Among the people questioned, either in person or over the telephone, were
Clarence Mitchell, NAACP; Cenoria Johnson, Urban League; Tim Sampson, National
Welfare Rights Organization; Philip Ryan, in the offices of Marian Wright, Counsel to
the Poor People's Campaign; Steven Rosenfield, Citizens Advocate Center; Norman
Kurland, Citizens Crusade Against Poverty; and Larry Silver, Neighborhood Legal
Services Program. All of the above are located in Vvashington, D.C. Also questioned
were Gary Bellow of the California Rural Legal Assistance Program, McFarland,
California; Junius Allison of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Chicago; and Leroy Clark, formerly of the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund of
New York.
14. For example, the Poor People's Campaign demanded of the Department of
Labor "[i]nvolvement of the poor in decision making about manpower training and
other employment programs"; of the Office of Economic Opportunity "that the O.E.O.
reorder its priorities so that the consumers of services be involved in the policy making
•.• of those programs which continue to be administered by the agency"; of the De•
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (1) "that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare require of grantees that poor people be included in planning
bodies under the comprehensive health planning and Medicare programs which
have provisions for citizen membership on their planning boards" (2) that HEW
"[e]stablish a national structure and mechanism which provides for continuous input
by poor black, brown, and white people in the design, development, operation and
evaluation of all federally funded education programs" and (3) that HEW "requir[e]
that [welfare] recipients be involved in making policy and program decisions about
how the program will be carried out by the states and localities."
The quoted demands may be found in the mimeo sheets entitled "Statement of
Demands for Rights of the Poor Presented to Agencies of the U.S. Government by
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Its Committee of 100, April 29-30,
May 1, 1968" presented by the Poor People's Campaign to each of the above agencies.
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demands, some federal agencies tacitly admitted that the poor had
been inadequately represented in the formulation of administrative
policy. Those few agencies stated that they intended to adopt new
means to enhance the poor's participation in that process.115 This fact
correlates with the previously reported responses to question 6 of
the questionnaire.
The official agency responses to some of the specific substantive
demands made by the Poor People's Campaign of 1968 may also
constitute some evidence that the poor have been inadequately
represented in the federal rulemaking process. After examining
objections raised by the poor, a number of agencies admitted that
several of their substantive policies questioned by that Campaign
were inadequate and should be changed. 16 This indicates that these
15. For example, note that the Department of Health, Education, and ,velfare
replied to the Poor People's Campaign by stating that (I) "We will increase our efforts
to involve persons representative of the poor in our activities and on our Advisory
Committees," (2) "we will establish, and require each state to establish, some vehicle
for obtaining the advice of the poor, especially recipients in program and policy development," and (3) "the Commissioner [of Education] and members of his staff will
meet with a group of persons broadly representative of the poor and arrange for
continued participation of such a group with respect to all federally funded education
programs in the Office of Education"; the Department of Labor responded by stating
that "[a]dditional efforts to reach and to communicate with the poor must be made
so that their needs are understood"; and the Office of Economic Opportunity responded
to the Poor People's Campaign by stating that "[t]he Community Action Program is
instituting a system by which drafts of major policy instructions will be circulated for
comment to all grantees and national organizations interested in community action
before becoming official. Representatives of the poor on C.A.A. boards and advisory
counsels shall thus have a chance to discuss policy and make their views known to
O.E.O. before the policy is formally adopted ..•. The O.E.O. will involve the poor as
consultants in O.E.O. program development."
The above quotations may be found in the official responses from each of the above
agencies to the demands of the Poor People's Campaign. Letters to the Reverend
Ralph Abernathy from Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
May 25, 1968, and June 18, 1968; from Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, dated May
27, 1968; from Bertram Harding, Acting Director of OEO, undated and titled "Office
of Economic Opportunity Response to Poor People's Campaign."
16. For example, in response to a request for more stringent enforcement of fair
employment by federal government contractors, the Department of Labor stated that
it "will issue new guidelines requiring firms holding government contracts to use hiring
and promotion tests that are racially culturally fair." It also stated that it "will issue
new regulations to tighten the Labor Department equal opportunity programs," expanding coverage from first level to all levels of subcontractors and requiring positive
action programs from contractors. Letter from ,vmard ,virtz, Secretary of Labor,
to the Reverend Ralph Abernathy May 27, 1968. Similarly, in response to a demand
that health services be made available to poor through comprehensive neighborhood
health centers, the Department of Health, Education, and ,velfare responded that it
will pool funds from different sections of HEW and other agencies to support comprehensive health services in poor urban and rural areas. And in response to a demand
that only declarations of facts be required of recipients under federally financed state
welfare programs the Department promised to institute such a system. For both of
the above HEW replies, see letter to the Reverend Ralph Abernathy from Wilbur
Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare May 25, 1968. Note also that of
the five high-priority changes in the size, shape, and location of food distribution
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agencies may not have been properly apprised of the relevant interests of poor people when the administrative decision makers first
formulated the policies involved. A few officials have privately admitted that this was the case in some of those situations. (Of course,
in other of those situations the decision makers may have been
adequately apprised of the relevant interests of the poor and simply
made unwise policy decisions. High quality representation of the
poor's interests in rulemaking cannot invariably assure that administrators will make wise decisions!)
Similarly, a number of recent lawsuits may also attest to the inadequate representation accorded the poor in the federal rulemaking
process. These suits indicate, in one way or another, that certain
federal administrative action or inaction did not properly protect
the interests of poor people.17 A possible implication may be that
the interests of the poor were so inadequately represented in those
agencies' policymaking processes that a lawsuit was required to induce proper protection for the economically underprivileged.
To all the above evidence may be added the fact that many
scholars studying the poverty problem agree that the interests of
the poor are inadequately represented in the rulemaking process.
Moreover, in some situations the administrative rules or lack of
administrative rules implementing a particular program affecting
the poor treat the interests of those people in such a way that the
poor were not likely to have been properly represented in their
formulation. 18 It should also be recalled, as noted previously, that
administrative policy makers almost always have middle-class backgrounds and therefore are not usually personally familiar with, or
natural advocates for, the interests of the poor.
programs demanded by the Poor People's Campaign of the Department of Agriculture, four were at least partially met. Des Moines Register, Nov. 16, 1968, at 8, col. 4,
5; Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1968, at 2, col. 3.
17. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), holding that the Alabama substitutefather regulation (which requires disqualification of otherwise eligible children from
federally supported aid to dependent children if their mother cohabits with a man not
obligated by Alabama law to provide support) defines "parent" in a manner inconsistent with the national Social Security Act and is therefore invalid with respect to
the program. 392 U.S. at 333 n.4. To the extent HEW approved any man-in-the-house
provision in state plans that conflicted with the Social Security Act that approval
was improper because it was inconsistent with the controlling federal act. After King v.
Smith, HEW issued new regulations outlawing such substitute-father rules. 33 Fed.
Reg. 11290. In Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967), a tenant in federally
assisted low rent public housing was given notice of eviction without explanation after
being elected president of a tenants' organization. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below affirming eviction and remanded for a reassessment of that judgment in
light of directive issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development after
grant of certiorari requiring that no tenant be given notice to vacate without reasons
for eviction and a chance to explain.
18. See, e.g., Note, Welfare's "Condition X", 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967).
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C. Some Definitions

In light of the above evidence, a number of specific recommendations with respect to representation for the poor in federal rulemaking seem appropriate. To assure precision, several terms utilized
in the attached recommendations (see Appendix A) and in the remainder of this Article deserve definition. The words "poor" and
"economically underprivileged" are used as synonyms. They refer
to that group in our society unable to represent adequately its collective interests in federal rulemaking because its members lack the
individual or organizational financial resources to do so. Consistent
with this definition some groups of individuals may be poor or
economically underprivileged in relation to certain rulemaking and
not in relation to other rulemaking. This Article and the accompanying recommendations assume that people will be treated as
poor only in the rulemaking situations where they are unable to
represent themselves adequately because of their financial incapacity. Depending on the circumstances it is possible, therefore, that
those who are deemed poor for present purposes may vary to some
extent with the particular rulemaking involved.
The "rulemaking" referred to is that defined by section 2(c) of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).19 "Rulemaking"
therefore means "agency process for the formulation, amendment or
repeal of a rule." The word "rule" refers to "the whole or any part
of any agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency . . . .''20
D. The Precise Scope of the Task

The purpose of the appended recommendations is to assure that
the interests of the poor in our society are adequately represented
in all federal rulemaking having a substantial impact on them. In
doing so, the primary concern is the ability of the economically
underprivileged to participate in rulemaking both for those programs directly aimed at them and for those which, although not
directed at the poor, substantially affect them as a separate group.
However, the need for adequate poor people's representation in
rulemaking extends beyond this. Rulemaking for some programs
thought not to concern the poor and usually not affecting the poor
may, on occasion, have a large impact on them. Consequently, an
19. 5 U.S.C. § IO0l(c) (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
20. 5 U.S.C. § l00l(c) (1964), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
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adequate remedy must include a mechanism for monitoring, on behalf of the poor, all federal rulemaking; and it must assure, insofar as
practicable, representation for the poor in all rulemaking having a
substantial impact on them, even though that rulemaking occurs
in a particular program not normally having that kind of effect.
The need to secure representation for the poor for all rulemaking
of this sort is especially critical when it is remembered that rulemaking is frequently not an on-going process. It may be a one-time
affair resulting in a rule to last for the indefinite future. Failure to
assure adequate representation for the poor's interests in all rulemaking having a substantial impact on them as a separable group
may, therefore, have long-term rather than short-term deleterious
consequences in many situations.
It would be simple to formulate a nearly perfect solution to
the problem under consideration if the poor were a monolithic or
homogeneous group with its own democratically elected representative structure which could be called upon to articulate the particular
interests of the poor wherever they were affected. The fact is that no
organization, group, or individual can rightfully assert that it speaks
for all the poor of this country in any truly democratic or representative sense. The poor are too heterogeneous and diverse; their interests too disparate and fractionalized. Even the sum total of all groups
or organizations purporting to represent the interests of the American poor do not do so in any really democratic sense since most
poor people are not members of any such group or organization.
The interests of the majority of poor may also sometimes diverge
from the views of the many organized groups purporting to speak
for some segment of them or for all of them. In addition, the leadership of some so-called "poor people's groups" may fall into the
hands of persons who are in fact out of touch-or simply not concerned-with reflecting the views and promoting the welfare of the
mass of the economically underprivileged. For these reasons, the
creation of a truly representative agent to articulate and represent
the heterogeneous interests of the poor is both impractical and infeasible. Consequently, the most satisfactory means of assuring adequate representation for the poor in federal rulemaking substantially
affecting their interests will necessarily be imperfect. It also may
have to be, in at least one sense, artificial and imposed from above.
Efforts to secure adequate representation for the economically
underprivileged in all federal rulemaking having a substantial impact on them will have to move on two fronts to be successful. An
attempt must be made to assure that federal agencies making rules
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of this kind independently seek to ascertain from the poor their
views with respect to such rules. In addition, an attempt must be
made to help the poor obtain affirmative representation for their
interests in the rulemaking process. That is,. some means must be
devised by which to assure that these people have a competent,
consistent, and aggressive advocate for their interests before federal
agencies. Within the limits set by this two-pronged approach, a
desirable solution should also be feasible-that is, realistically
achievable; should take account of the fact that the interests of the
poor needing representation may often be fractionalized and diverse; should be workable in an everyday, operative sense; and should
be as economical as possible. Moreover, such a solution should be
practical in the sense that the positive contribution it may make to
the administrative process should overbalance any negative impact
it may have on that process or other societal values. A desirable
resolution of the problem under consideration should also make it
as obvious as possible to the poor that their views will be adequately
represented in rulemaking. This particular requirement may not
directly enhance the proper functioning of the administrative process as such. It may, however, help to eliminate that portion of the
poor's distrust of and dissatisfaction with government which stems
from their perception that officialdom does not adequately consider
their views when it makes policy affecting them.
II.

AssuRING .AFFIRMATIVE AGENCY AcrrnN

To

AscERTAIN

THE VIEWS OF POOR PEOPLE

A. Generally
Officials responsible for promulgating rules substantially affecting the economically underprivileged segment of our society should,
where feasible, increase their existing efforts to ascertain independently the views of poor people. They should also devise additional
effective means by which to do so. This approach stresses the ability
of the several agencies involved to develop and utilize affirmative
procedures for obtaining, through direct and continuing contact
with the poor themselves, the specific information that they should
consider when they formulate their programs affecting the poor.
There is an analogy in Budget Bureau Circular A-85, which is
entitled "Consultation with Heads of State and Local Governments
in Development of Federal Rules, Regulations, Procedures and
Guidelines." This document orders federal agencies to follow certain procedures geared to assure that there is adequate consultation
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with the heads of state and local governments prior to the promulgation of rules for the implementation of specific kinds of federal
programs vitally affecting them. The Defense Production Act of
1950 also provided that "[a]ny rule, regulation, or order, or amendment thereto, issued under authority of this Act shall be accompanied by a statement that in the formulation thereof there has been
consultation with industry representatives, including trade association representatives, and that consideration has been given to their
recommendations ...." 21 Similarly, federal agencies should follow
procedures with respect to rulemaking that will assure, where feasible and practicable, independent agency efforts to ascertain directly
from the poor their views with respect to proposed rules substantially affecting them.
B. Some Specific Suggestions

Agencies administering programs of concern to the poor should
be urged to hold formal hearings-that is, oral public hearings-on
proposed rules in close geographic proximity to the poor people affected. They should also be urged to obtain witnesses and solicit
written views from among the affected poor and organizational
representatives of the affected poor. Federal agencies should use
special notice and hearing arrangements tailored to meet the peculiar problems of economically underprivileged persons in order to
assure their effectiveness in accurately and successfully obtaining
the views of such people. As an illustration, publication of a proposed regulation and notice of a public hearing in the Federal
Register may constitute adequate notice for middle and upper income Americans whose agents or group representatives read that
periodical, but it is usually inadequate by itself to apprise the poor.
To faciliate affirmative agency action to ascertain the views of the
poor, increased use of field surveys should also be encouraged. In
addition, or as an alternative to some of the above suggestions,
agencies should hold very informal conferences with the poor in
their own neighborhoods in order to discuss with them contemplated
rulemaking affecting such persons' interests.
Agencies should also be urged to pay certain of the personal expenses of economically underprivileged witnesses in rulemaking
hearings where that would help assure adequate representation for
the poor. In this way the federal agencies may facilitate the appearance of an adequate number and variety of poor people's represen21. Act of Sept. 8, 1950, ch. 932, § 709, 64 Stat. 819.
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tatives in such proceedings. If economically underprivileged individuals must incur transportation, meal, or babysitting costs in
order to testify on behalf of the poor, of if they must lose a day's
wages, they should be reimbursed. Unlike the more affluent members of our society, poor people cannot afford to finance the extra
costs involved in representing their own interests. At the present
time most agencies are probably unable or unwilling to pay such
expenses incurred by underprivileged persons seeking to represent
the interests of the poor in rulemaking hearings. In order to remove
any doubts as to their authority, federal agencies should be expressly empowered, in their discretion, to pay the basic personal
expenses incurred by poor persons acting in such a capacity.
Each agency administering programs ·with a high impact on the
poor should also be urged to constitute, where practicable, a formal advisory committee to apprise the agency of poor people's
interests that should be weighed in the operation of its programs.
These committees should be composed of persons who are themselves economically underprivileged, or the direct and close representatives of such persons. The committees should be continually
kept informed of those activities of their respective agencies that
specially concern them; and they should be consulted for their
views before the agency makes any rules substantially affecting the
interests of the economically underprivileged segment of our society.
All expenses incident to the operation of such advisory bodies
should be borne by the respective agencies. "Regulations for the
Formation and Use of Advisory Committees" already exist.22 These
might be revised, expanded, and reoriented for this purpose.
In the future, the Administrative Conference of the United
States should monitor the extent to which federal agencies actually
do institute specific procedures like those just discussed. Government
officials must be induced to increase their 01m affirmative efforts to
ascertain the views of the poor with respect to rulemaking which
affects them substantially. If the Conference finds that the recommendations urging voluntary agency action in this regard are not
adequately affecting official behavior patterns in practice, it might
then recommend that agencies be required to follow certain of the
above specific procedures with respect to particular programs.
Although federal agencies might, if necssary, be required to follow some of the procedures outlined above in specific programs or
situations, there are a number of reasons why federal agencies
22. Exec. Order No. 11,007, 27 Fed. Reg. 1875 (1962).
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should not be required to follow certain of those procedures in every
case where they engage in rulemaking substantially affecting the
poor. These procedures may be completely superfluous in a number
of cases because the views of the poor are unmistakably clear and a
matter of public record. In addition, many of the specific procedures
outlined as possible means to induce affirmative agency ascertainment of the poor's interests in agency rulemaking may be very impractical. The agencies have an undisputed need to conduct their
affairs inexpensively, simply, conveniently, flexibly, and expeditiously. Requirements of the sort outlined above may be unusually
difficult to draft and administer because of the peculiar problems in
defining precisely those whose views the agency must solicit or appoint as representatives of the poor, when or where oral hearings
or conferences must be held or field surveys taken, and the like.
Whether an oral hearing should be held with respect to a certain
proposed rule, precisely where and when it should be held, who
exactly should be invited to testify, and whether a field survey should
be made are all judgment questions. Someone, probably the rulemaking agency, must exercise some discretionary judgment. And to
require useless hearings, conferences, or field surveys, endless lines
of repetitive and inarticulate witnesses, and the like, would be to
interject the worst kind of mischief into the administrative process,
hamstringing rather than improving it.
However, if federal agencies will voluntarily follow the previous
suggestions in all those situations where they are feasible, practicable, and necessary to assure that officials are fully informed about
the relevant interests of the poor, the agencies will help solve the
problem under consideration. The proposals outlined in this section have the advantage of assuring self-starting and independent
affirmative agency action to secure information directly from the
poor concerning their position with respect to rulemaking substantially affecting them. An effective pipeline from the poor to
those who are responsible for rulemaking decisions could result.
The fact that the government would bear the sole or primary financial burden for this mode of assuring consideration of the poor's
interests in rulemaking also enhances its attractiveness and effectiveness.

C. The Inadequacy of Affirmative Agency Efforts
Procedures to assure self-initiated affirmative official action to
ascertain from the poor their views with respect to agency rulemak-
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ing will, if sound in their details, undoubtedly be helpful; but such
procedures are entirely inadequate solutions for the problem at hand
in at least one major respect. They do not completely compensate for
that which the poor currently lack. Economically underprivileged
people do not have the resources necessary to assure a technically
sound and consistently available articulate presentation of their
views concerning rulemaking to the appropriate agencies. Those segments of our society with adequate economic resources have long employed legal counsel-with their special technical proficiencies,
knowledge, and skill as advocates-for these purposes. By the use of
lawyers' professional abilities, the well-financed have assured that the
kind of representation actually afforded their interests before government policy makers is qualitatively high, and much more effective
than it could possibly be othenvise.
The poor are entitled to, and must have in order to make their
interests known effectively, both the quantity and quality of representation in rulemaking before federal agencies that commercial
corporations and labor unions consistently utilize. That necessitates
furnishing the poor, in one way or another, with legal counsel for this
particular purpose. Because the poor lack the personal and organizational resources to hire such skilled, persistent, and knowledgeable
help, affirmative agency efforts of the kind discussed above, although
useful, would still result in qualitatively inadequate representation
in rulemaking for the economically underprivileged segment of
our society. The reason for this is that existing sources of public
and private legal aid to the poor, such as legal aid and public defender programs, do not usually provide the economically underprivileged segments of our society with representation in rulemaking. These programs are primarily, if not exclusively, concerned
with serving the interests of individual poor clients in adjudicative
or potentially adjudicative situations.

III. A

CLEARINGHOUSE COORDINATOR?

The poor might obtain the quantity and quality of representation they need for their views in federal rulemaking if a wellfinanced clearinghouse-coordinator organization was created. Such
an organization could systematically furnish all poor people's groups
in this country with information concerning existing or proposed
federal administrative regulations having a substantial impact on
the poor. In addition, it could encourage and coordinate participation in federal rulemaking by organizations representing the eco-
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nomically underprivileged. Where necessary, this entity could also
finance participation in rulemaking by various poor people's groups.
That is, the clearinghouse coordinator might make conditional
limited-purpose grants to poor people's organizations so that they
could individually hire personal legal counsel to represent their
views in a particular rulemaking matter. Such a clearinghouse coordinator would not itself attempt to play any direct role as an
advocate in the rulemaking process. It would not act as a separate
representative of the poor. An organization of this type could be
financed by private contributions, government grants; or both, and,
it could be constituted as an independent private body under the
control of all of its constituent users in order to assure the maximum
satisfaction of its clients.
Utilization of this kind of clearinghouse coordinator has several
advantages as a solution to the problem of improved representation
for the poor in federal rulemaking. It would encourage and facilitate more frequent and continuous representation of poor people's
interests in the rulemaking process by organizations and groups
representing some segment of the economically underprivileged. The
clearinghouse coordinator might also result in representation for
more of the many divergent and disparate interests present in that
group in our society loosely characterized here as "the poor" than
would otherwise be the case. In addition, the existence of such a
body might induce a better and more accurate presentation of the
views of the poor on many matters than might be the case with some
other solutions. This is true because the source of the views and the
representation of those views would be relatively close to the poor
themselves. Since this solution would provide poor people's groups
with funds to engage their own separate and personal counsel for
the purposes of representation and advocacy in rulemaking proceedings, it would assure that the views of those organizations are
accurately, articulately, knowledgeably, and aggressively presented
to the agencies in question.
Still, such a clearinghouse-coordinator organization is probably
an inadequate and inefficient solution to the problem at hand. It
assumes that existing organized groups purporting to represent the
poor can or will do an adequate job of protecting those people's
interests with respect to federal rulemaking if such bodies are kept
informed of the facts, their efforts are coordinated, and sufficient
financing is made available to them. This is a questionable assumption, although admittedly it is hard to prove or disprove entirely on
the basis of undisputed evidence. Existing poor people's organizations
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have sometimes been aware of proposed or existing rules of special
concern to the poor generally, and yet have failed to act.23 In many
of these instances, their failure cannot be attributed entirely to a
lack of organizational resources.
It should be reiterated that most poor people do not belong to
organizations dedicated to protecting and advancing their interests;
and the views of "poor people's groups," or of the controlling
leadership of such groups, may frequently be out of touch with, or
divergent from, the interests of the mass of the poor. The clearinghouse-coordinator proposal will not, therefore, consistently assure
adequate representation in rulemaking for the collective interests
of the poor as a general group. The device may assure representation in rulemaking only for the views of organized poor people's
groups, or for the views of the leadership class of those groups. Depending on the specific case, that kind of representation may or may
not be adequate to protect the interests of the mass of the poor people in this country.
The grant-financed efforts of numerous poor people's groups,
each seeking to represent separately the interests of the economically
underprivileged in federal rulemaking, may also be unduly duplicatory and therefore wasteful and unnecessarily burdensome to the
administrative process. Furthermore, many administrative difficulties
will appear in any effort to entrust a mandatory grant-making responsibility to the clearinghouse coordinator. Must every organizational
applicant seeking funds with which to represent the poor in federal
rulemaking be financed? If not, which groups in any given situation
should be financed? These difficulties could be largely avoided if,
depending on the facts of each case, the clearinghouse coordinator
had the option of representing the interests of the poor itself or contracting with others to do so. In addition, freedom for each poor
people's organization to hire its own separate lawyer for these purposes may be much more expensive and less effective than providing
the poor with one specialist law firm working full time to represent
their collective interests in federal rulemaking.
For all of the above reasons the clearinghouse-coordinator approach to solving this problem is inadequate. It is too likely to result
in uneven and inconsistent representation for the collective interests
23. The Department of Agriculture's Commodity Distribution and Food Stamp
programs for the poor are an example. Although poor people's organizations were
aware of the existence of those programs and the Department rules under which they
were operated, they did not seem to take any active interest in those programs until
the last year or so.
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of the poor as a class in federal rulemak.ing. Moreover, it seems
relatively uneconomical and inefficient. As subsequent discussion
will demonstrate, a more desirable solution to the problem under
consideration can be formulated. That solution could assure more
adequate representation for the poor in federal rulemaking than the
clearinghouse coordinator. At the same time, it could also incorporate, by one means or another, most of the special advantages of
the clearinghouse coordinator.
IV. THE

INDEPENDENT POOR PEOPLE'S COUNSEL

A. Generally
The most desirable solution to the problem under consideration
would seem to be the creation of a people's counsel organization
which would hire a staff to represent the interests of the poor in all
federal rulemaking that substantially affects them. 24 Such a counsel
would be an artificial representative for the poor in this process
without any pretense of being a democratically chosen spokesman of
24. This seems to be the general philosophy of the Feighan Bill, H.R. 17974, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), the text of which follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That it is fundamental to wise administrative
rulemaking that, except in limited or unusual circumstances, persons whose interests may be affected be assured of an opportunity to participate in rulemaking
through submission of data, views, or arguments to the responsible rulemaking
agency. Rulemaking frequently affects persons without the resources necessary to
keep themselves informed concerning proposed rules or to petition for rules or
amendment or repeal of rules. Hence it is necessary that means be provided
whereby, insofar as feasible, the interests of such persons may be protected in
rulemaking and whereby the rulemaking process may be benefited by advocacy on
behalf of such interests.
SEC. 2. Section 553, in chapter 5, Administrative Procedure, of title 5, United
States Code, is hereby amended by adding thereto the following subsection:
"(f) The Attorney General is directed to enter into contracts with, or to make
grants subject to appropriate conditions to, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, or such other nationally organized nonprofit bodies with generally
similar objectives as he may deem desirable, whereby such body or bodies may be
provided with funds to enable them to participate in rulemaking in accordance
with this section on behalf of interested persons who, because of their lack of
personal resources, are unable effectively to do so. Any such body shall be deemed
to be an interested person for the purpose of this section. Such body or bodies
may contract with other persons to aid in effectuating the purposes of such contract or grant. The Attorney General is authorized to adopt such rules or regulations as may be appropriate to the administration of this subsection. He is authorized, further, after consultation with the agency involved, by order to make this
section applicable to matters relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits,
or contracts in circumstances where he determines tliat such matters so affect the
interests of persons of limited means as to make it aJ:>propriate that, in connection
with rulemalcing with respect to such matters, a body or bodies receiving a con•
~ct or grant under this subsection should have an opportunity to represent such
mterests."
SEC. 3. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such funds as are
necessary to carry out the provisions of section 2.
Senator Hart introduced the same bill in the Senate as S. 3703, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968).
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the poor. This counsel, as an advocate, would be charged with the
responsibility of separately and independently representing the
collective interests of the poor as a class in all federal rulemaking.
Where the interests of the poor on a pending rule are divergent, it
would also be responsible for assuring the representation of those
disparate views either in its own presentation or by other individuals
or organizations. In performing its representational responsibility
for the economically underprivileged, such an advocate would be
under an affirmative duty to seek the advice and help of relevant
sources of every kind, whether private or governmental, individual
or organizational. It would be obliged to use every device available
to keep in as close touch as possible with the needs and views of
those whose interests it purports to represent. Although such a
counsel's staff would probably be middle class, great pains should
be taken, and special procedures instituted, to prevent it from being
captured or dominated by a middle-class point of view.
As an aid in this respect, it might be desirable to establish official
advisory committees to the poor people's counsel in each area of
major concern such as welfare programs, housing, employment,
education, and so forth. The membership of such committees should
be composed of individuals who are as representative of the poor of
this country as possible. These committees should not, however,
become the exclusive source for the poor's communication with
their people's counsel. There is always a danger that committee
members, regardless of the care exercised in their appointment, may
have divergent views and interests from the mass of the economically
underprivileged. For this reason, the people's counsel should hold
informal hearings among the poor on the larger and more important
issues so that it can better represent their interests on those subjects.
Close liaison between the people's counsel and Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) community action groups, legal aid societies,
civil rights organizations, and other poor people's groups throughout the country is also crucial. This will help to assure that the
people's counsel will remain as reflective as possible of the real interests, views, and needs of those people in our society that it ultimately must serve.
B. Specific Functions of the Poor People's Counsel

The people's counsel would do everything necessary to represent
effectively the interests of the poor in all federal rulemaking substantially affecting them. Such a body would perform most of the
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same functions for the poor with respect to the federal rulemaking
process that Washington law firms perform for their well-financed
clients. It would monitor the activities of federal agencies to assure
that it is fully informed with respect to all rulemaking or potential
rulemaking affecting the interests of the poor. When a federal
agency proposes new rules of concern to the economically underprivileged, counsel for the poor would present their views on the
desirability of the proposed· regulations and actively lobby for the
interests of the poor. This would include the drafting of substitute
rules for the ones suggested by the government agency. Additionally,
the people's advocate would formulate, and urge the appropriate
authorities to adopt, entirely new rules and revisions of old rules
substantially affecting poor persons. To perform these functions,
the people's counsel would need an adequate staff not only of
lawyers, but also of economists and other social scientists. This
would assure that it will be capable of competently responding in
kind to the arguments and technical data presented by the personnel
of the various agencies with which it must deal.
In addition, the poor people's advocate would be charged with
some of the specific obligations of the clearinghouse coordinator.
That is, it would keep organizations representing the poor informed
as to all federal rulemaking affecting their interests, and it would
coordinate and facilitate those organizations' separate participation
in such rulemaking if any of them had the desire and capacity to do
so.
The people's counsel should also be authorized, in its discretion,
to make contracts with other organizations as a means of helping to
represent, in the rulemaking process, minority or divergent viewpoints with respect to the interests of the poor. Interjection of such
minority or divergent views into the rulemaking process may be a
function that the people's counsel will want to contract out to others
because, by doing so, it might avoid some possible internal conflicts
of interest in its organizational setup. The extent to which this
contracting power is actually used ought to be left to the sole discretion of the people's counsel. Nevertheless, the expectation is that
the staff of the people's counsel will normally perform all of the
representation functions assigned to it.
The people's counsel would occasionally propose to the President
or Congress, or both, new legislation (or executive orders) geared to
institute reforms in administrative programs substantially affecting
the poor. An agency may refuse to exercise its existing authority to
make the kind of rules deemed necessary by the people's advocate
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to protect the interests of its constituency. Or an agency willing to
make such rules may not have the authority to do so because legislation forbids it or fails to authorize it. In all of the above cases
Congress can correct the situation by statute and thereby ensure the
promulgation of rules satisfactory to the people's counsel. As a
result, the advocate of the poor should be empowered to propose
legislation to Congress or the President when that would be an aid
in performing its primary responsibility-effectively representing
the poor's collective interests in federal rulemaking.
The people's counsel should also be empowered to play an independent role in the judicial review of federal administrative rules.
As a representative of the poor, the counsel should be able to challenge in court, under its own name, the validity of any federal rule
substantially affecting poor persons. Only with this authority will
the views of the people's counsel have any creditable weight with
the agencies before which it is to operate. The image and attendant
effectiveness of the people's advocate will be greatly enhanced if
federal agencies know that the people's counsel can freely institute
judicial review of agency rules under its own name and solely on its
own initiative. Absent that authority, the people's counsel might be
totally ignored by the administrative establishment; officialdom
would know that there is little bite behind the counsel's bark. Power
to seek judicial review of an agency's rules on the grounds that they
are unauthorized, are in conflict with a statute, are unconstitutional,
or have been promulgated without the required procedure is, therefore, very important. The poor's advocate should not be forced to
give up after it unsuccessfully opposes the promulgation of a certain
rule that is antithetical to the interests of the economically underprivileged if that rule is vulnerable to attack in the courts.
The ability to sue in its own name as an official representative of
the poor is also especially important to the people's counsel because
that right frees the counsel from any dependency on particular poor
persons who would otherwise have to be the named plaintiffs in such
suits. Since it is responsible for representing the collective interests
of the poor, the people's counsel should not be put in the position of
having to reconcile that duty ·with the individual interests of a
particular poor person acting as official plaintiff in a court case. In
addition, if the poor people's advocate can sue in its o·wn name,
many administrative difficulties and extra expenses can be avoided.
Congress should, therefore, specifically vest the people's counsel
with this right. Delegation of that authority to such a counsel would
not, of course, preclude other individuals and organizations with
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standing from seeking judicial review of federal agency rules on
behalf of poor people's interests.
A very broad precedent supporting the right of a representative
body to seek judicial review of administrative action adversely
affecting those whose interests it seeks to protect is Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC.25 That case
held that a church has standing as a "party in interest" to seek
judicial review as a representative of its members as listeners whose
interests the FCC is required to protect. Since that organization
was a voluntary-membership body seeking to assert the rights of
persons who freely chose to join it, the Church of Christ case might
be distinguished from the situation under consideration here. However, if an act of Congress expressly authorized the people's counsel
to seek judicial review of federal rules having a substantial impact
on the poor, in its own name as an official representative of such
persons, the standing of that counsel would be clear. Of course, a
question might be raised whether a case or controversy exists in a
judicial proceeding pitting an artificial poor people's representative
accorded such a statutory right to judicial review against an agency
whose rules are challenged on behalf of the poor. However, it seems
clear that one exists. A statute of Congress would impose a legal duty
on the people's counsel to protect the interests of underprivileged
persons in federal rulemaking-a duty that would include attempts
to invalidate improper rules in court; and the various federal agencies have an adverse legal obligation to defend the integrity of their
rules against attack by others. Some might argue that :Muskrat v.
United States26 casts doubt upon the ability of such a people's counsel
to sue in its own name as a representative of the poor, even after
Congress specifically empowers it to do so. But that case is probably
no longer the law. 27
As a wise allocation of its resources, the people's counsel may
frequently elect to assist other agencies representing the poor to
prosecute court cases relating to the validity of federal administrative regulations instead of instituting such suits itself. To this end it
might distribute to appropriate legal aid organizations memoranda
explaining that specified regulations may be subject to successful
attack in the courts. In addition, the people's advocate could give
25. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
26. 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (holding that Congress could not authorize named Cherokee
Indians to institute suits on their own behalf and on behalf of other Cherokees having
similar allotments to determine the validity of acts of Congress restricting alienation
of certain land and increasing the number of persons entitled to share in it).
27. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Tmcr 374 (1959).
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technical or financial aid to a local legal aid organization attempting
to prosecute, on its own, a test case concerning some federal rule
that is inconsistent with the poor's interests. The people's counsel
could also generally coordinate the efforts of legal aid groups with
respect to the judicial review of federal agency rules.
The people's counsel should also be empowered to intervene
under its mm name on behalf of the poor in those agency adjudicative proceedings substantially affecting the economically underprivileged. The poor as a group may have as vital an interest in
the outcome of certain agency adjudication as they do in most
rulemaking proceedings affecting them. Many very important administrative policies are established as a result of ad hoc agency
adjudication. At present, the collective interests of economically
underprivileged people are inadequately represented in such federal
administrative adjudication; effective participation in those proceedings requires certain skills and expertise not available to most
local legal aid societies who have had little experience with the
intricacies of adjudication before federal agencies. Therefore, apportioning this function to the poor people's counsel seems wise.
Representation of the poor in agency adjudicative proceedings
is closely and intimately tied to the counsel's other responsibilities.
Assigning this function to the people's advocate will economically
utilize the expertise in federal administrative law that it will necessarily acquire through the performance of its other duties. However,
the people's counsel will not be empowered to initiate adjudicative
proceedings before federal agencies in its own name; as an official
representative of the poor, it will be limited to participating in such
proceedings as an intervenor. Where necessary, traditional channels
of legal aid can be expected to initiate such agency adjudicative
proceedings in the name of individual economically underprivileged
clients.
Ordinarily the people's counsel should not perform the responsibilities of an ombudsman or personal legal counsel. That is, it
should not normally handle the individual grievances of, or seek
remedies for, particular poor clients. An ombudsman or personal
legal counsel becomes preoccupied with the details of numerous
individual claims and is therefore likely to lack a sufficiently broad
independent perspective about the best ways of serving the poor as a
whole. If it acted to represent particular clients, the proposed body's
individual caseload would be much larger than its job of affirmatively
representing the poor as a class in federal rulemaking. As a result,
the latter function may be obliterated by the former function. In
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addition, since all citizens, rich or poor, may experience administrative arbitrariness and ineptitude, all should have access to an ombudsman. But to be effective, the office contemplated here must
concentrate on and become expert in the special problems of the
poor. It must look at these problems and proposed solutions solely
from the viewpoint of the poor. Furthermore, the people's counsel
should be primarily concerned with affirmatively representing the
interests of such individuals prior to, and as a means of avoiding,
their need for an ombudsman; but because of the nature of an ombudsman's responsibility, a people's counsel charged with that additional function may see the needs for affirmative representation in
rulemaking primarily in terms of the poor's appearance in its office
for ombudsman's help. However, there may be very rare occasions
when the people's counsel should be able to represent a particular
person because that is the best or only means by which to test a
certain agency policy affecting the poor as a class. In those cases it
should be free to do so, but only if absolutely essential to its primary function as advocate for the collective interests of the poor in
federal rulemaking.
Finally, it should be recognized that the interests of the poor and
the interests of higher income groups may sometimes be identical
with regard to certain rulemaking or agency adjudication. To assure
adequate representation for the economically underprivileged, the
people's counsel must have the independent authority to participate
on behalf of the poor in all rulemaking and agency adjudication of
concern to those people. However, a wise allocation of the advocate's
resources should lead it to concentrate its efforts on representation
of the poor in those situations where the interests of the poor are not
adequately protected by the endeavors of other more affluent groups.
C. Locating and Structuring the People's Counsel

I. A Government Office of People's Counsel
The proposed people's counsel might be constituted as a permanent, single-purpose, and relatively independent federal government
office located outside of any agency before which it would have to
represent the poor. A number of arguments of varying merit have
been made in favor of making the poor's advocate an integral part
of the governmental establishment. It has been contended that
federal agencies might be more receptive to a presentation of the
poor's views by another part of the official establishment than by
outsiders. Therefore, the argument continues, as a part of the
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governmental structure the people's counsel might be more effective
than if it were outside of that structure. If it were part of the official
establishment, such a people's counsel might also be accorded access
to useful information and resources that it otherwise might not be
able to obtain. Furthermore, indicating that representation of the
poor's interests has special importance by making it a part of the
government itself might give the economically underprivileged the
feeling that the official establishment really cares about their interests. As a government office, the people's counsel might also have a
certain prestige and respectability not otherwise obtainable which
would facilitate the recruitment and retention of a competent staff.
In practice, many of these assertions about the advantages of
placing the people's counsel inside of government may prove to be
unrealistic or erroneous. Moreover, location of the people's counsel
as a part of government may actually be disadvantageous for a number of reasons. As a full-time employee of the United States Government, the poor's advocate is more likely than otherwise to become,
at least over time, a captive of the establishment-out of touch with
the poor, docile, and therefore ineffective. After all, a certain in
terrorem effect would always exist because the appropriations for
the office would continually be subjected to congressional approval.
And the professional associations of the staff of the people's counsel
under these circumstances would be with other government officials,
all working for the same principal, and all having common interests
and problems in the long run.
The idea that a government agency can do an effective job
because it would be a member of the team is chimerical. One of
the basic strengths of our legal system is its reliance on the adversary
system. The handling of things by a member of the team smacks
of "Big Brotherism." The poor would probably lack confidence
in a people's counsel who, although charged with representing their
interests, was part of the very government establishment they wanted
to influence. The poor might well believe, regardless of actual
performance, that any full-time government employee purportedly
representing their interests was really not doing so. Furthermore,
the underprivileged segments of our society seem to reject the basic
philosophy underlying the approach that would appoint a government official to represent their interests. In the past few years the
more militant elements of the poor have demanded that the poor
themselves be accorded a direct voice in controlling their destiny.
Finally, locating the people's counsel as a part of the federal establishment may make it less effective than otherwise possible because
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its freedom to innovate and experiment may be curtailed by government red tape and bureaucratic requirements.
There is some precedent supporting the suggestion that a special
government house counsel be created to represent a group unable
to represent effectively its mvn interests before federal agencies because of its large size, amorphous nature, and lack of organization.
There was an independent Office of Consumers' Counsel charged
with asserting consumers' interests in bituminous coal proceedings
before the National Bituminous Coal Commission.28 The Department of Agriculture also had, at one time, a Division of Consumers'
Counsel which participated in proceedings within that department on
behalf of consumers. 29 A similar position seems to have existed for a
period in the National Recovery Administration, the Department of
Labor, and the Department of the Interior.30 More recently, President Johnson announced the creation of the Office of Consumer
Counsel in the United States Department of Justice.31 This new office
did not begin to function until the very end of 1968 because the first
appointee died before he could assume his duties. The status of the
office is now unclear due to the change in national administrations.
In any case, the newly created Office of Consumer Counsel would
not be an adequate solution for the problem at hand since the interests of the poor affected by the rulemaking process are substantially
broader than those interests deriving from their status as consumers.
History may support the idea that a people's counsel of the sort
contemplated here should not be constituted as a part of the government establishment. Almost all of the consumer's counsel offices
organized as separate entities ·within the federal establishment have
atrophied and disappeared. Most of them seem to have faded because, among other things, they were ineffective and made no
significant contribution to the administrative process. Although not
completely clear, the reasons for the conspicuous lack of success of
these offices seem to have included their intimate connection with
the government establishment (as an official and integral part of it),
and their structural position within that establishment-that is, the
fact that they were located inside of the very agencies before which
they were to represent the consumer's interests.32
28. 1968-69 U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 687, 708.
29. Id. at 691.
30. Id. at 687.
31. See White House Press Conference of Betty Furness, Special Assistant to the
President on Consumer Affairs, and Attorney General Ramsey Clark discussing the
establishment of this office (mimeo Feb. 6, 1968).
32. On the operation of these consumer counsels see generally R. BAKER, THE
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2. A Private Office of the People's Counsel

A second means of constituting the people's counsel is to utilize
a private organization outside of government for these purposes.
By relying on a body outside the federal establishment, the people's
representative in rulemak.ing proceedings may be able to be more
closely tied to and identified with the needs of the poor than would
be possible if it were an official organ of the United States Government. A nongovernmental body may also be able to communicate
more effectively with the poor than an official one. As a private
organization separated from the government hierarchy, it may be less
susceptible to being captured by the ideas and values of the government agencies before which it would represent the interests of the
poor. A private people's counsel may also be less susceptible than a
similar public counsel to intimidation by government agencies; if
so, the private organization would be a more aggressive and persistent representative of the poor's interests in rulemaking than a
public body.
As suggested above, such a private body may also be more flexible
and thus better able to experiment and innovate in the performance
of its assignment than a government-based equivalent. This greater
freedom may be especially useful with respect to recruiting a staff
and administering its activities. Moreover, this freedom may mean
that a private people's counsel would be more efficient in the long
run than a government body. As noted earlier, the poor are likely to
have greater confidence in a private counsel's representation of their
interests than in a public counsel's performance of that job because
their advocate would not be part of the very establishment which
they are trying to influence. The actions of a private counsel may
also be more visible to the poor than the actions of a public counsel
which could easily get lost in the huge federal bureaucracy and become relatively invisible to outside viewers. This greater visibility
might make a private counsel more responsive to the interests of the
poor and a greater source of satisfaction to them.
On the other hand, it has been urged that such a private organizational representative of the poor might not be as influential or
effective in rulemak.ing proceedings as an official agency of the
NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL COMMISSION: .ADMINISTRATION OF THE BITUMINOUS COAL
Acr, 1937-1941 at 221-53 (1941); H. JOHNSON, THE BLUE EAGLE FROM EGG TO EARTH 295-96
(1935); L. LYON, P. HOMAN, G. TERBORGH, L. LORWIN, C. DEARING, & L. MARSHALL, THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY .ADMINISTRATION 123-28, 210-14 (1935); Lewis, The "Consumer" and
"Public'' Interests Under Public Regulation, 46
POL. EcoN. 97, 103-06, 106 n.10
(1938); E. NOURSE, J. DAVIS, & J. BLACK, THREE YEARS OF THE AGRICULTURAL .ADJUSTMENT
.ADMINISTRATION 391-95 (1937).

J.
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United States charged with the same obligation. By virtue of its
official status, a public people's counsel charged with representing
the poor may be offered greater cooperation and opportunity for
participation in rulemaking affecting the poor than a private organization charged with the same duty. In addition, a private people's
counsel may not be, in and of itself, as effective a mechanism as a
public people's counsel to convince the poor that the federal government really wants their interests represented in its rulemaking
process. A more likely disadvantage of a private body might be its
greater susceptibility to capture by the interests of some small segment of the poor, with the result that it would only serve the interests of that special group among the poor rather than the interests
of the poor as a whole. However, this disadvantage can be offset by
structural devices geared to avoid that situation; and it must be
weighed against the specific advantage that the private organization
is less susceptible to being captured by the "government view" and
more likely to be in close touch with the real needs of the poor.

3. The Public Broadcasting Corporation Model: A
Compromise Solution
A third solution to the problem of properly positioning the
people's counsel is a beneficial compromise between the alternative
of locating the advocate for the underprivileged inside the federal
government and locating it entirely outside and separate from that
establishment. The poor's representative described herein could be
constituted as a completely independent, federally chartered corporation similar in most respects to the recently created Corporation
for Public Broadcasting3 3 or the long established American National
Red Cross.34 These organizations are hybrid public-private bodies.
As such, they provide a model for the people's counsel which may
combine the advantages of the purely public body with the advantages of the purely private body and minimize the disadvantages
of each.
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting, for example, was
created by a special act of Congress as an independent, nonprofit,
and no-stock entity.35 It is headed by a bipartisan body of fifteen
members whose qualifications and fixed terms of office are set by
statute. They are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate and are authorized to make policy for the body
33. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
34. 36 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. III, 1965·1967).
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and direct its affairs. The act creating the corporation specifies its
purposes and powers. It also expressly authorizes the body to obtain
grants from, and make contracts with, individuals and private and
governmental organizations and institutions. According to the statute, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting must submit detailed
annual reports to the President and Congress outlining the activities,
financial condition, accomplishments of the organization, and any
recommendations it deems appropriate. In addition, the statute requires an annual audit of the corporation's books by an independent
certified public accountant. The financial operations of the body
and its grantees' use of corporation funds may also be audited by
the United States Government for those fiscal years during which
federal funds are involved.
But the public broadcasting body is otherwise independent of
federal authority and is more nearly private than public. The statute
specifically declares that it is not "an agency or establishment of the
United States Government." 36 Neither the directors of the corporation nor its agents are federal employees by virtue of their connection with the organization. In addition, full-time federal government
employees are specifically excluded from appointment to the governing board of the corporation. Finally, the enabling act expressly
notes that nothing contained in any of its provisions "shall be
deemed . . . to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or
control . . . over the Corporation or any of its grantees or contractors . . . .''37
The private corporate structure of a people's counsel modeled
after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting assures it the advantages of a purely nongovernmental body. An organization of this
kind is effectively insulated from federal control of its day-to-day
policy determinations. It can aggressively represent the interests of
the poor before federal agencies and advocate views distasteful to
officialdom without fear of crippling government intervention. Such
a body is also free, because of its private organizational structure,
of all of the operational rigidities and inflexibility associated with
a government agency. Like a purely private entity, such a corporation is not bound by the rules of the federal bureaucracy with
respect to such things as the hiring and compensation of staff, and
the means by which its business is conducted. Consequently, this
corporate entity will have as much freedom to experiment and
!16. 47 U.S.C. § !!96(b) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
!!7. 47 U.S.C. § !!98 (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
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adapt its practices to changing exigencies as a purely private organization. The structure of a corporation of this kind also permits it to
draw very easily on both public and private means of support without unduly complicating the organization's affairs or threatening
its independence in the way that a government agency's independence would be threatened.
In addition, a people's counsel corporation of the type under
discussion here, like a purely private entity of that sort, can be
more closely tied to, and identified with, the needs of the poor than
a similar government body. This can be achieved by stipulating
certain specific qualifications for appointment to the organization's
private governing board. Similarly, an entity modeled after the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting may also be able to communicate with the poor more easily and flexibly than if it were a
direct part of the federal establishment. Because this kind of entity
is not part of the "official government team," it may be less susceptible than a purely public body to being intimidated or captured
by the ideas, values, and interests of the agencies with which it deals.
The economically underprivileged may also have more confidence
in a people's counsel structured in this way than in one located
within the federal government; it is apparently independent of
federal influence and is controlled by a private board structured
to reflect the interests of the poor. The actions of such a government-chartered but independent counsel may also be more visible to
the poor than a similar government counsel lost inside the vast
federal establishment.
If the people's counsel were constituted as a body like the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, it would also have many of the important advantages of a government-based people's counsel. In
quasi-public form, it may have higher status and prestige than
a purely private people's counsel. Thus, it might well be able to
secure a more qualified staff and a stronger board of directors than
could a private body. Such an organization can easily be funded by
the national government and can deal to some extent as an official
equal with federal agencies. As a quasi-official body, federal agencies
might be more receptive to its presentation of the poor's views
than if those views were presented by a purely private body; and,
a quasi-official people's counsel might be accorded access to information and resources not as easily obtainable by a purely private entity.
This seems to have been true of the Red Cross, for example. Constituting the people's counsel as such a quasi-official body might also
give the poor a feeling that the federal government itself really cares
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about them and is attempting to ensure fair representation for their
views ,vi.th respect to rulemaking that vitally affects their interests.
At the same time, the independent structure of the people's counsel
organization assures the poor that a meaningless "Uncle Tom" has
not been created.
The above discussion suggests that the best way of structuring
the people's counsel is to establish it as a quasi-public body modeled
on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. At the start, such a
body would, of course, require action by Congress. After it was set
up, it would not be dependent on the government to any appreciable extent except perhaps for part of its financing-an aspect
which will be discussed below. Careful drafting of the enabling
statute should assure the creation of an effective and meaningful
advocate for the poor in all federal rulemaking substantially
affecting them.

D. Financing the People's Counsel
Financing the people's counsel raises additional problems. It is
clear that a rather large infusion of new money will be needed to
support such an entity on a long-term, continuing, and effective
basis. Resources currently available to the poor and their organizational representatives are totally inadequate to support this new
responsibility in any satisfactory way. The source of the extra money
required could be federal, private, or both. Utilization of federal
money for this purpose has some distinct advantages. The function
which must be performed is too important and urgent a part of the
federal administrative process to entrust its support to the uncertainties of private fund raising. Only an infusion of federal money can
guarantee, relatively soon, the kind of funding that is necessary for
this project to assure proper, immediate representation of the type
contemplated here. The circumstances of the era in which we live
suggest that it is too late to talk solely in terms of a short-term
demonstration project. What is needed-and needed now-is adequate representation for the poor in federal rulemaking on a permanent, reliable, and quantitatively sufficient basis.
However, it may be possible to secure the funds needed to
promote a quasi-public people's counsel from nongovernmental
sources. Large charitable foundations might provide a long-term
guarantee of adequate revenue, especially if they understood the
vital and special importance of this particular project. In addition,
individual and business contributors might be induced to support
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such a body in the same way that they support charities such as legal
aid societies. However, to attract substantial gifts of private funds
from individual or business donors, the people's counsel corporation
must be a tax exempt charity. In order to clear up any doubts on
that subject, Congress should specifically stipulate in the statute
creating the people's counsel that it is tax exempt for these and
other purposes.
A number of arguments suggest the long-term desirability of
financing such a people's advocate exclusively from nongovernment
funds if that should prove practical, feasible, and realizable sufficiently quickly. As a contractor with the federal governmentbound to provide in return for monies furnished the representation
required-the people's counsel becomes, to some extent at least,
a tainted instrument of the government in the eyes of the poor.
Even if it is not true, the poor may feel that their counsel will not
bite the hand that feeds it. Furthermore, because of the grantmaking agency's authority to discontinue grants to the people's
counsel, that agency will be in a position to exert pressure on the
advocate for the poor which might be deleterious to the most
vigorous performance of its duties. If the people's counsel even
fears that aggresive and persistent representation in rulemaking
of certain unpopular views favoring the poor might induce a withdrawal of federal funds, it may become timid, lethargic, and unnecessarily cautious. In addition, a grant of federal funds is rarely made
without relatively detailed conditions, and such strings might
remove some of the desirable flexibility and capacity to innovate
and experiment normally possessed by a privately financed operation
of the same sort.
However, the above objections to the use of federal funds are
not sufficiently important to be controlling if government money is in
fact necessary to finance such a people's counsel quickly, adequately,
and on a long-term basis. If government financing is required, the
OEO might logically be considered as a funding agency. The sole
purpose of the OEO is to help the impoverished of this country. In
addition, it is in an especially good position and has the specialized
resources to evaluate the faithfulness and effectiveness with which
the people's counsel represents the interests of the poor. Through its
Community Action Programs, Vista Volunteers, Legal Services Offices, and Job Corps Centers, the OEO is in daily, intimate contact
with the poor. It also has the advantage of a broad and continuing
experience with the poor and their special needs and problems, and
a particular interest in providing funds to secure adequate legal
representation for the economically underprivileged. Empowering
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the OEO Legal Services Program to make grants to a people's counsel
for the purposes outlined in this Article might just round out this
federal agency's current attack on inadequate legal representation
for the poor generally.
On the other hand, there is a very persuasive reason to appoint
another federal agency as the grant-making body. The OEO is
one of the most significant federal agencies making rules with a
substantial impact on the poor. That body will, therefore, be one of
the agencies before which the people's counsel will continuously
have to represent the collective interests of the poor. If the OEO
were designated as the agency to finance the people's counsel, it
would necessarily be put in a position whereby it could influenceperhaps detrimentally-its grantee's representation of the poor with
respect to the OEO's rulemaking. Regardless of the purity of the
OEO's actions in this regard, such a structural situation might cause
the people's counsel to be unnecessarily timid in representing the
poor's interests before the OEO. Designation of the OEO as grant
maker for this purpose would also make less credible to the poor the
efforts of the people's counsel to represent their interests before the
OEO. Even if it were untrue, the poor might think that their counsel
would be likely to play ball with its benefactor. For these reasons,
any government grantor of funds to support the people's counsel
should not be an operating agency whose programs have a large impact on the poor.
V.

SECTION

4

OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Acr

A. Generally

Even if the above recommendations are adopted, there is inadequate assurance that the interests of the poor will be represented in federal rulemaking unless some means is devised by which
to guarantee such persons notice of proposed regulations substantially affecting them and an opportunity to submit their views to the
proper authorities. The required notice and opportunity-to-participate provisions of section 4, subsections (b)-(e) of the APA might be
adequate for this purpose were it not for the blanket exemptions
from those provisions found in section 4(a).38
38. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1964):
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that there is involved(!) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served
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A majority of the federal administrative programs substantially
affecting the poor are excepted from the notice and opportunity
to participate requirements of subsections (b)-(e) by the exemption
for matters relating "to public property, loans, grants, benefits or
contracts" found in subsection (a)(2). This means that in rulemaking for most programs of special concern to the poor, federal
agencies need not give any notice of proposed regulations in the
Federal Register. Similarly, in the excepted situations, federal
agencies need not allow "interested persons," including the poor
or their representatives, to participate in rulemaking "through the
submission of written data, views, or arguments" or through "the
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
0£ course, the relevant agencies have the discretionary authority
to give notice and allow participation in the excepted situations, but
they are under no obligation to do so.
B. Should the APA Be Modified To Cure this Problem?
Question 3 of the special questionnaire sent to the relevant
federal agencies as part of this study asked:
In developing and promulgating rules for the implementation of
each of these programs [with a substantial impact on the poor], does
your department or agency follow the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice
shall include(!) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and
a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice
and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.
After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply
instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not
less than 30 days before its effective date except(1) a su!Js~antive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a
restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published
with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
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553(e) [APA section 4, subsections (b)-(e)], even when the rulemaking
proceeding is excepted from these provisions by one of the exclusions in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) [APA section 4(a)]? If you do not do so,
please describe the procedures you do employ in rulemaking in each
of these programs.

The ovenvhelming majority of answers to this question indicated
that the reporting agencies do not follow the notice and opportunityto-participate procedures of subsections (b)-(e) when their rulemaking is excepted from them under section 4(a).39 Only a very few
agencies indicated a contrary practice, and even these confessed to
inconsistency in this regard. 40 In addition, rulemaking procedures
actually utilized by the agencies in the excepted situations are inadequate substitutes for those found in subsections (b)-(e) of APA
section 4. Substitute procedures are not consistent and do not, in
most cases, assure adequate notice to the poor or a sufficient opportunity for their participation. In some cases not governed by subsections (b)-(e), the agencies simply determine the rule they think appropriate and promulgate it without notifying or consulting with
anyone outside the agency. 41 In other cases, agencies give notice to,
and engage in informal consultation with, whomever they happen to
think appropriate under the circumstances.42
39. The Department of Agriculture, for example, reported that "the Department
does not follow the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-553(e) in developing and promulgating rules for the programs listed above"; the Department of Housing and Urban Development reported that "the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-(e) are not followed for
programs covered by the exemption"; and the Veteran's Administration reported that
"in developing and promulgating rules for the implementation of veteran's programs
we do not generally follow the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-553(e), as our rulemaking
procedures arc excepted by the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2)."
40. For example, the Department of Labor reported that "in cases of rulemaking
excepted from 5 U .S.C. 553 the Department of Labor does nevertheless follow the
provisions of section 553 when it deems it appropriate or desirable to do so." The Department of Transportation also reported that while it does follow § 553(b)·(e) [APA
§ 4, subsections (b)•(e)] for some programs exempted from § 553 (APA § 4), at the
present time it does not do so for most such e.....:empted programs.
41. For example, the Small Business Administration reported that "under the
exemption in 5 U.S.C. § 553(a), rules for [the Local Development Company Loan
Program and the Economic Opportunity Loan Program] are initially published and
issued in the form adopted by the agency." The Department of Labor reported as to
rulemaking exempted from § 553 (APA § 4) that it "frequently gives public notice of
proposed rulcmaking and invites public participation therein when the proposed rule
is expected to have widespread effects and when for any other reason it is considered
desirable to obtain the views and objections of those to whom the rules would apply.
Othenl'ise, the rules are evaluated by the bureau concerned, and are adopted and
published in the Federal Register."
42. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority reported that "the formulation
and implementation of TVA policies in carrying out its program of resource develop•
ment use are excluded from the rulemaking procedure of 5 U.S.C. § 553 by the provisions of subsection (a). Such policies and the implementations thereof are determined
by the TVA Board and are recorded for internal guidance in an administrative code.
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Question 4 of the questionnaire asked the same federal agencies
responding to the prior question the following:
What disadvantages, if any, do you see in a statute which would
eliminate the exclusions now in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) [APA section 4(a)]
as they may apply to ..• [your programs with a substantial impact
on the poor], and thereby would make the provisions of 5 U.S.C.
553(b).553(e) [APA section 4, subsections (b)-(e)] applicable to all
rulemaking relating to these programs? (Assume that the several
exceptions now in sections 553(b) through (e) would remain unchanged.)

Although a number of agencies saw no substantial disadvantages in
eliminating the blanket exclusions of subsection (a) under the specific conditions indicated in the above question,43 most respondents
thought it undesirable to eliminate any of these exclusions. The reasons advanced for maintaining the section 4(a) exceptions to the requirements of subsections (b)-(e) varied: elimination of the exceptions is unnecessary; 44 it would make rulemaking too cumbersome
and thereby deprive the agency of desirable and necessary flexibility
in the adoption of its rules; 45 it would cause needless and injurious
delay in the final promulgation of rules for some programs; 46 it
They are brought to the attention of interested units of government, organizations,
and institutions, through discussion and negotiation and appropriate press releases."
The Department of Agriculture responded with respect to its food programs that it
does not follow § 553(b)-(e), but that "before their adoption, proposed regulations
and amendments thereto are discussed with district personnel of the Department and
with representatives of the State agencies, in general conferences, regional conferences
or operating as task force groups." (Note that recipients of these food programs or
their representatives were not among those listed as being consulted.)
43. The Department of Labor reported that it "does not anticipate substantial
disadvantages to the programs listed in response to question 1 from the elimination
of the exclusions now in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)" and the Department of Transportation
reported that "we would not object to elimination of the exemptions for loans and
grants. The Department is, in fact, not taking advantage of the exclusion in the case
of Federal airport aid, and is considering following this course in the case of its other
grant and loan programs."
44. For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare replied that
"we have found that in the grant-in-aid field, publication of notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register is not the most suitable way to focus the attention 0£
interested persons, agencies and groups on the proposal.''
45. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority responded that "application of
the rulemaking procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 to the TVA resource development program would decrease its flexibility and hinder its effectiveness.'' Similarly the Department of Agriculture reported that "it would be unnecessarily cumbersome to apply
the procedures of the statute and might deprive the Department of a desirable flexibility in the adoption of rules.''
46. The Department of the Interior stated, for example, that "we would not favor
the elimination of the exclusions in 5 U.S.C. 553(a) since to do so could produce
injurious delays in• the adoption of regulations.'' Similarly, the Small Business Administration replied that "it could complicate or delay rulemaking," and the Depart•
ment of Agriculture reported that the "F.H.A.'s operations would be seriously delayed
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would cause a tremendous increase in agency work and operating
costs; 47 it would be insufficient as a means to assure in all cases adequate participation by the relevant people in rulemaking and, therefore, might sometimes needlessly require an agency to follow two
sets of procedures in order to involve properly the right persons; 48 it
might put the agency and those most directly affected by its policies
in an adversary position, thereby discouraging mutual cooperation
toward obtaining the best solutions to common problems; 49 and, it
might conflict with some specific provision of the agency's enabling
act. 60
In light of the injurious effect which these exemptions have on
the ability of the poor to represent their interests in rulemaking,
the above reasons for continuing them for programs substantially
affecting the poor do not seem persuasive. It should be noted that
elimination of the across-the-board exemptions in section 4(a) would
still leave section 4(b)(B) in force. This provision states that "when
the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and
a brief statement of reasons therefore, in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedures thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," it does not have to utilize
such procedures in its rulemaking. Furthermore, if the policies
expressed in subsections (b)-(e) are presently sound respecting unexcepted situations, they should be equally sound with respect to
"public property, loans, grants, benefits and contracts." The reason
and reduced in effectiveness if its rules were subjected to the mandatory notice and
public procedure requirements."
47. For example, the Veteran's Administration responded that elimination of the
section 553(a) exclusions "would lead to heavier workloads within the agency and a
resulting increase in cost, as well as delay in implementation of newly enacted laws
with a resulting delay in awarding benefits thereunder." In addition, although the
Department of Labor saw no substantial drawbacks to repeal of the exemption in
section 553(a) it did note that it "would, of course, substantially increase the cost of
Government."
48. For example, the Office of Economic Opportunity responded that "the major
disadvantage in a statute which would eliminate the exclusions now in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)
is that it would require OEO to follow two sets of procedures, those of 5 U.S.C. 553,
which would generally prove ineffective in reaching the poor, and those currently
followed, particularly by CAP, which have proved effective and are constantly being
made more effective."
49. The Tennessee Valley Authority responded that "procedures for the formulation of policies under the rulemaking requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553 would place TVA
and its distributors in an adversary position where the tendency would be for each
distributor or group of distributors to try to gain an advantage in the formulation
of the policy rather than working with TVA and other distributors in a mutual effort
to find the best possible solution to each problem as it arises."
50. For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reported that
with respect to some programs, "the authorizing statute provides for rulemaking
procedures other than those provided by the APA • • • ."
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for this is that the previously noted objections to the application
of subsections (b)-(e) to the classes now excepted by subsection (a)
can also be leveled against the applicability of the former provisions to rulemaking not presently excepted by subsection (a).
Consequently, there are no persuasive arguments which preclude
repeal of all exemptions contained in section 4(a) as they may
apply to programs with a substantial impact on the poor.
The exemptions contained in section 4(a) of the APA might,
therefore, be amended to require federal agencies to follow the
provisions of subsections (b)-(e) in all situations where their rulemaking has a substantial impact on the poor. A statutory change of
this kind is somewhat broader than, but generally similar to, that
contained in a recent bill introduced by Congressman Feighan
of Ohio. 51 Congressman Feighan's bill would authorize the Attorney
General of the United States to lift the exemption contained in section 4(a) whenever he deems that desirable to protect the interests
of the poor. Once the Attorney General lifted the exemption as to a
particular rulemaking situation because the "interests of persons of
limited means ... make it appropriate," any "interested person,"
rich or poor, could presumably assert rights to participate under subsections (b)-(e). As noted earlier, agencies have unlimited discretion
to permit public participation in situations excepted by section 4(a),
but they are not required to do so; the Feighan bill would only extend this same discretion to the Attorney General where he decides
the interests of the poor require it.
Some might argue that the Feighan bill, or a broader revision of
section 4(a) expressly requiring federal agencies to follow the provisions of subsections (b)-(e) for all rulemaking having a substantial impact on the poor, raises serious fifth amendment due process questions of an equal protection nature. The argument is that statutory
revisions of this sort give the poor an unfair and irrational advantage
over all other Americans. The proposed modifications would require
federal agencies to provide notice and an opportunity to participate
in normally exempted situations where the poor would be benefited
by such rights; but these modifications would not oblige agencies to
provide these opportunities where they would only benefit the more
affluent. However, this classification is rational because, unlike the
poor, the American upper and middle classes have adequate alternative means for protecting their interests in rulemaking.
51. H.R. 17974, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); see note 24 supra.
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To protect their collective interests, the more affluent members
of our society do not need formal notice of proposed rules and an
official opportunity to present their views to the appropriate authorities. After all, most official policy makers are middle-class persons
who have had middle-class experiences and daily associations. Consequently, those who are responsible for making administrative
regulations are oriented toward the middle-class point of view and
are generally conversant with the collective interests of that group.
They are, therefore, likely to understand and protect the collective
interests of the more affluent, even where such persons do not have a
chance to represent their interests formally in rulemaking proceedings vitally affecting them. In order to equalize the poor's position
in rulemaking with that of better financed segments of society,
the poor may need special guarantees to assure full consideration
of their views.
Modification of the section 4(a) exemptions along the lines suggested above would assure that the poor and their representatives,
including the people's counsel, would have a reliable means by which
to discover and participate in proposed rulemaking of concern to
them; they could simply watch the Federal Register. Such a change
could probably be effected either by statute or by an executive order,
since the President has the authority to command his subordinates
to do that which they now have the discretion to do. Since a purely
procedural requirement of this type would not seem to interfere with
the substantive policy-making functions of the independent federal
agencies, they may also be bound by such an order.
However, there is a substantial evidence that section 4(a) needs
a general legislative overhaul. Alteration or repeal of that provision
has been proposed apart from any more specific consideration of its
effect on the ability of poor people to represent their interests adequately in the rulemaking process. 52 Testimony adduced in the course
of congressional hearings suggests the possible desirability of acrossthe-board revisions of the section 4(a) exemptions. 53 Consequently,
it may be wise to leave the provision as it is pending further inquiry
into the advisability of amending it generally. Instead of narrowly
altering the provision at this time in order to solve the particular
52. See, e.g., S. 163, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1964) (Comm. Revision); S. 518, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1967).
53. Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcom. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings on
S. 518 Before the Subcom. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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problem under consideration, federal agencies should simply be
urged, in strong terms, to follow the provisions of subsections (b )(e) for all rulemaking substantially affecting the poor.
C. Special Notice and Hearing for the People's Counsel

For the present purposes, another proposal can be made which
would partly obviate the need to amend the current exemptions
contained in section 4(a). All federal agencies contemplating the
promulgation of rules substantially affecting the poor should be required to notify the people's counsel of the pendency of such rules
and to give this advocate for the underprivileged an opportunity to
present the views of the poor. Imposition of this type of duty on a
federal agency is not unprecedented. For example, Budget Bureau
Circular A-85, discussed previously,54 directs federal agencies to follow specific procedures with respect to the development of rules and
policies for federal assistance programs that include among their
eligible recipients state or local governments or quasi-public agencies.
Unless special circumstances preclude it, issuing agencies are required to provide the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) with a copy of all proposed regulations-usually
not less than forty-five days prior to their intended promulgation.
The ACIR is then under a duty to transmit that information to
various state and local government associations which have, normally,
three weeks in which to comment to the agencies on the proposed
regulations or policies. Another similar obligation to provide special
notice and opportunity to appear is imposed by statute on the
Interstate Commerce Commission:
Before hearing or disposing of any complaint (filed by any person
other than the Secretary) with respect to rates, charges, tariffs, and
practices relating to the transportation of farm products, the [Interstate Commerce] Commission shall cause the Secretary [of Agriculture] to be notified, and, upon application by the Secretary, shall
permit the Secretary to appear and be heard. 55

A similar requirement should now be adopted for all federal
agencies with reference to their proposed promulgation of rules substantially affecting the economically underprivileged. If such a procedure were made mandatory, the present exceptions contained in
section 4(a) would not seriously prejudice the ability of the poor to
54. See page 523 supra.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 129l(a) (1964).

January 1969]

Federal Rulemaking

553

have their views represented in the formulation of rules substantially
affecting them. When it received notice of such contemplated rule•
making, the people's counsel would disseminate that information to
all interested poor people's organizations. After obtaining feedback
from them, the people's advocate would affirmatively represent the
views of the economically underprivileged to the relevant agency.
The effective and economical operation of the people's counsel
therefore makes it desirable to impose the following requirements
on federal agencies: they must notify the poor's "official" group
counsel of all proposed rulemaking substantially affecting poor persons and give it an opportunity to communicate to appropriate of•
ficials the views of the economically underprivileged with respect to
those proposed rules.
It is true, of course, that this limited requirement would not be
as satisfactory a cure for the problem as an outright modification
of section 4(a) in all cases where poor people's interests are con•
cerned. A substitute provision of the kind suggested above would
not assure notice of proposed rulemaking to anyone but the people's
counsel and those informed by the people's counsel; and in such
circumstances no one but the people's counsel would have a right
to present formally the views of the poor with respect to those rules.
However, pending general revision of section 4(a), this seems a de•
sirable requirement and a minimally satisfactory substitute guaran•
tee for present purposes.
To ensure that the administrative process is not unreasonably
burdened in some situations, an exception similar to that found
in APA section 4(b)(B) should be engrafted onto the narrow require•
ment discussed above. Federal agencies should be allowed to promulgate rules substantially affecting the poor without giving prior notice
and an opportunity to be heard to the people's counsel "where the
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the :finding and a
brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice
and . . . [an opportunity for the people's counsel to present its
views prior to promulgation of the rules] are impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest." In cases of this sort,
agencies should be required to notify the people's counsel, as soon
as practicable, of any consumated rulemaking substantially affecting the poor. Moreover, they should also be required to provide it
an opportunity to present the views of the poor with respect to the
desirability of amending or rescinding any such rules. This require-
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ment will at least facilitate a reconsideration of accomplished rulemaking in light of the views of the poor where presentation of their
position is impractical prior to rulemaking.
The specific requirements suggested here with respect to giving
the people's counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard could
be imposed by statute or executive order. The latter method might
be as efficacious as the former in binding independent regulatory
agencies, since the order would deal only with a matter of procedure and would not attempt to invade their substantive policymaking functions. The ease with which such an order could impose
or remove these requirements, or modify them as the need dictates,
may also make it a more desirable tool for this purpose than a statute.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Any attempt to cure the poor's lack of representation in federal
rulemaking substantially affecting their interests requires a number
of remedies rather than a single one. Congress should institute
procedures to facilitate and encourage greater self-initiated efforts by
relevant administrative agencies to ascertain the views of the poor.
Some body must also perform the functions of a clearinghouse
coordinator in order to facilitate greater affirmative participation
by the poor and their organizational representatives in rulemaking.
To ensure consistent, affirmative representation of high quality
for the collective interests of the poor, Congress should create a
people's counsel with the responsibilities described above. To perform its function properly, the people's counsel must receive notice
of contemplated rulemaking affecting the poor, and must have an
opportunity to present poor people's views on the proposed rules
to the relevant agencies.
All of these measures in combination should-if properly executed in light of their purposes-provide an adequate remedy for
the problem at hand. These recommendations are desirable because
they will improve the administration of government. They will
assure that the administrative decision makers in the federal
establishment are better informed about the interests of the poor
than at present. These proposals should also eliminate one source of
unnecessary tension between the poor and the federal establishment. They will provide procedures whereby the poor can get a
fair hearing on the formulation of significant public policies affecting them. The specific proposals made here will not create any sub-
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stantial negative impact on the rulemaking process. They will make
important affirmative contributions to that process. Since the lack of
representation for the poor in federal rulemaking is a critical problem, these proposals should be implemented as swiftly as possible.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

Recommendations Suggested to the Administrative Conference of the United
States on the Basis of the Above Study of
Representation for the Poor in Federal
Rulemaking.

Recommendations Adopted December
10 and 11, 1968, by the Administrative
Conference of the United States With
Respect to Representation of the Poor
in Agency Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them.
(These are the only statements on this
subject attributable to the Administrative Conference of the United States.)

In this context the term "poor" refers to that group of persons in our society unable to secure adequate representation of its collective interests in federal
rulemaking because its members lack the
individual or organizational financial resources to do so.
A. AGENCY EFFORTS

The rulemaking referred to is that defined by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
I (a) Federal agencies should engage
in more self-initiated affirmative efforts
to ascertain directly from the poor their
views with respect to rulemaking substantially affecting them. For this purpose agencies should increase their use
of existing procedures and should devise
and utilize new procedures.

I. Federal agencies should engage more
extensively in affirmative, self-initiated
efforts to ascertain directly from the poor
their views with respect to rulemaking
that may affect them substantially. For
this purpose, agencies should make strong
efforts, by use of existing as well as
newly devised procedures, to obtain information and opinion from those whose
circumstances may not permit conventional participation in rulemaking proceedings. The "rulemaking" referred to
is that defined by the Administrative
Procedure Act, § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. 551(4) and
(5).

(b) Where feasible and practicable
agencies should do as many of the following as are necessary to assure that
they are fully informed with respect to
the relevant interests of the poor.

2. Agencies should employ as many of
the following procedures as are feasible,
practicable, and necessary to assure their
being fully informed concerning the relevant interests of the poor:

(I) Agencies should make a special
effort to assure that the poor are effectively informed of all proposed rulemaking substantially affecting them, and
should provide opportunities for the poor
to submit their views with respect to
such rulemaking.

(a} Agencies should seek to inform
the poor of all rulemaking proposals that may affect them substantially and should provide opportunities for the poor to submit
their views concerning these and
related proposals.
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(2) Agencies should hold formal public hearings or informal conferences in
close geographic proximity to the poor
affected by contemplated agency rulemaking.

(b) Agencies should hold formal public hearings or informal conferences in close geographic proximity to the poor substantially
~ffected by contemplated rulemakmg.

(3) Agencies should specially invite
individuals constituting a representative
cross section of the poor to submit their
views orally or in writing with respect to
proposed regulations substantially affecting the poor.

(c) Agencies should take care to invite
individuals constituting a representative cross-section of the poor
to submit their views orally or in
writing as to proposed rules substantially affecting the poor.

(4) Agencies should conduct field surveys among the poor to discover their
attitudes with respect to particular government policy-making substantially affecting them.

(d) Agencies should conduct field surveys among the poor to discover
their attitudes concerning particular government policy-making
substantially affecting them.

(5) Agencies should use advisory committees made up of representatives of
the poor as continuing consultants with
respect to all programs having a substantial effect on such persons.

(e) Agencies should use advisory committees made up of reeresentatives
of the poor as continuing counsultants for all programs having a
substantial effect on such persons.

(6) Agencies should, when necessary to
assure adequate representation for the
poor, pay the personal expenses and wage
losses incurred by poor individuals incident to their representation in agency
rulemaking hearings of such people's interests. Congress should clearly authorize
federal agencies to make, in their discretion, such payments.

(f) When necessary to assure adequate
representation for the poor, agencies should pay the personal expenses and wage losses incurred
by individuals incident to their
participation in rulemaking hear•
ings. Congress should support
agency requests for funds and for
authority, where none exists, to
make discretionary payments for
this purpose. Agencies already authorized to make such payments
in whole or in part should use
their existing authority and should
allocate funds accordingly.
In deciding whether the use of any
one or more of the above devices is feasible, practicable, or necessary in a given
situation, agencies should resolve doubts
in favor of utilizing them; but their enumeration should not exclude or discourage the development and use of other
devices to achieve the same result.

In deciding whether the use of any
one or more of the above devices is feasible, practicable, or necessary in a given
situation, agencies should resolve every
uncertainty in favor of utilizing them;
but their enumeration should not exclude or discourage the development and
use of other devices to achieve the same
result.

In carrying out paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this Recommendation, agencies should
consult with and coordinate their efforts
with other federal agencies having responsibilities in this area and should
make maximum feasible use of the facilities of such other agencies for communicating with and obtaining expressions of
the views of the poor.
III (b) Federal agencies should follow
the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(e) for
all rulemaking with a substantial impact
on the poor, even though some such rule-

3. Agencies should be encouraged in
appropriate circumstances to determine
that the exemptions in 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2)
should not be applied with respect to
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rulemaking which may have a substantial impact on the poor.
B.

PEOPLE'S COUNSEL

II (a) (1) An organization should be
created to employ a staff to act as "people's counsel." The people's counsel should
represent the collective interests of the
poor as a class in all federal administrative rulemaking substantially affecting
them.

4. (a) An organization should be authorized by statute to employ a staff to
act as "People's Counsel.'' The People's
Counsel should represent the interests of
the poor in all federal administrative
rulemaking substantially affecting the
poor.

(2) The people's counsel should be
charged with assuring that the views of
significant separable minority interests
among the poor are represented in that
process.

(b) The People's Counsel should be
charged with assuring that the views of
significant separable minority interests
among the poor are represented in such
federal administrative rulemaking.

(3) The people's counsel should be required to act as an information clearinghouse, disseminating intelligence respecting rulemaking substantially affecting the
poor to all interested poor people's organizations.

(c) The People's Counsel should be
required to disseminate to all interested
poor people's organizations pertinent information concerning rulemaking substantially affecting the poor.

(4) The people's counsel should be authorized to intervene in its own name to
represent the interests of the poor in
federal agency adjudicative proceedings
substantially affecting those persons.

(d) The People's Counsel should be
authorized to participate suitably in its
own name to represent the interests of
the poor in any federal agency proceedings in which the poor have a substantial interest.

(5) The people's counsel should be
empowered to seek judicial review of federal agency rules in its own name, and
on its own motion, as a representative of
the poor. This recommendation is not
intended to alter the kinds of agency
action amenable to judicial review or the
scope of that review.

(e) The People's Counsel should be
authorized to provide representation for
organizations and groups of the poor who
seek judicial review of administrative
action substantially affecting their interests. This recommendation is not to
alter the kinds of agency action amenable to judicial review, the requirements
of standing to seek review, or the scope
of that review.

(6) As an incident to its main responsibilities the people's counsel should be
empowered to recommend to Congress or
the President, or to both, such legislation
or other action as it deems appropriate
to solve problems of the poor.

(f) As an incident to its main responsibilities the People's Counsel should be
empowered to recommend to Congress or
the President or to both such legislation
or other action as it deems appropriate
to correct deficiencies in or otherwise improve federal programs having a substantial impact on the poor.

(b) (1) To pro\ide for the performance of the functions outlined in recommendation II (a) Congress should create a new single-purpose people's counsel
corporation modeled on the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting (47 U.S.C. § 396
et seq.).

5. (a) Congress should provide for an
appropriate body to perform the functions outlined in Section 4. Deserving of
consideration as such body would be a
new single purpose corporation, to be
created by Congress, modeled on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Pub.
Law 90-129, 81 Stat. 368 (1967), 47 U.S.C.
(Supp. III) 396, and to be known as
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the People's Counsel Corporation. In
the event this form of organization is
adopted, the following considerations
should apply:

(2) The people's counsel corporation
should be made tax exempt and authorized to accept grants of private funds.
Gifts to the corporation also should be
made deductible as charitable contributions for federal income tax purposes.

(1) The People's Counsel Corporation
should be made tax exempt and authorized to accept grants of private funds.
Gifts to the Corporation should be made
deductible as charitable contributions for
federal income tax purposes.

(3) Federal financing of the people's
counsel corporation should be made
available to the extent necessary to assure its effective operation.

(2) Federal financing of the Corporation should be made available to the
extent necessary to assure its effective
operation.

(4) The governing board of the people's counsel corporation should be constituted to give the poor meaningful
representation thereon. It should also be
constituted to ensure close communications and an identity of viewpoint between the poor and the people's counsel provided to represent their collective
interests.

(3) The governing board of the People's Counsel Corporation should be
constituted to give the poor meaningful
representation thereon. Such body should
be constituted to ensure close communication with the poor and effective
representation of the viewpoints of the
poor.

III (a) An executive order should require all federal agencies to notify the
people's counsel of any rules they propose to promulgate that would have a
substantial impact on the poor. They
should also be required by that executive order to give the people's counsel
an opportunity to present the views of
the poor with respect to such proposed
rules. Exceptions to these obligations
should be permitted only "when the
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules
issued) that [such] notice and ••• [an
opportunity for the people's counsel to
present its views] thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
In these exceptional cases agencies
should be required to notify the people's counsel, as soon as practicable, of
any consummated rulemaking substantially affecting the poor, and required to
give that counsel, as soon as practicable,
an opportunity to communicate to the
agency its views with respect to the desirability of amending or rescinding any
such consummated rulemaking.

6. All Federal agencies should be required by Executive order to notify the
People's Counsel of all proposed rules
which would have a substantial impact
on the poor. Agencies also should be required by that Executive order to give
the People's Counsel an opportunity to
present the views of the poor with respect to such proposed rules. Exceptions
to these obligations should be permitted
only "when the agency for good cause
finds (and incorporates the finding and
a brief statement of reasons therefor in
the rules issued) that [such] notice and
• . • [an opportunity for the People's
Counsel to present its views] are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest." (See 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(B).) In these exceptional cases,
agencies should be required to notify the
People's Counsel as soon as practicable
of any consummated rulemaking substantially affecting the poor, and should
be required to give the Counsel as soon
as practicable an opportunity to communicate to the agency its views concerning the desirability of further action
with respect to such rulemaking.
·without prejudice to creating or empowering any other appropriate body to
perform the general functions outlined
in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, any special
provision therefor should be so structured as to take maximum advantage of
the capabilities in this field of non-government organizations, and of other
public bodies, including notably the Office of Economic Opportunity.

